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APPELLANT'S CLOSING BRIEF 
I. RESPONDENT 1 S BRIEF VIOLATES I.A.R. , IS GLARINGLY 
AVOIDING· OF RESPONDING TO APPELLANT/$ CITED AUTHOR-
ITIES, CONTROVERTED FACTS AND ISSUES; AND MISSTATES 
GROSSLY THE ERRONEOUS RULINGS OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Respondent GMAC 1 s ten (10) page brief does not add-
ress, refutate or deny .the cited case authorities or law 
in ,ll.PPELLANns BRIEF nor does it address directly and 
,, 
with supported authorities the issues raised by Appellant. 
Respondent does cite two cases, to wit: feathetston v. 
Allstate Iris. Co., 125 Idaho 840, 875 P.2d 937 (1994) at 
P3, for the most preliminary, but nowhere complete rutes, 
of Summary Judgment; and P~fk0eit Hdmes, LLC v. Bifson 
(mi s s p p~ 1 Ting Homes , as Hones ) , l 4 9 Id ah o 6 0 3 , 2 3 8 P . 3 d 2 0 3 
(201d) at page 8, for the plpposition: the district court, may 
fix interpretation of the Decree of Summary Administration, 
I. C. l 5 - 3 - l 2 O 5, 11 s u a s po n t e. 11 But these aren 1t the significant 
· ·!i~d1ng,s··~'; and 1 e gal p r-i n c i pl es that a pp y here from Par kw est 
which void in entirety GMAC 1 s complaint and most flagrantly its 
c o n t 1r i,v e d a n d p r e s e n t e d m i s u s e a n d a b u s e of p r o c e s s b Y a 
•. 
defunct and WITHOUT STANDING~-DISENFRANCHISED CORPORATION VIA A 
PURPOR;TED NONDISCRIPT ~A0G"!=:·Nf}:it:ATHLEEN ~f!TZGERALO. The use of Fitz-
Gera.ldis rnie:>nve.ri.fi.cation· & Ja_ck_p;f standing/capacity, was to avoid 
GMAC I s c 0 u n s e l c om m i t t i n g p e r j u r y o r s u b o .r fla t i o n t h e r e o f . B u t s u c h 
use ~as sttll fraudulaen. t~ de.ce·pt,·_ye · 
_ by GMAC and its counsel. 
l 
Two coriclusions are to be derlved from ~MAC's uncited 
with no legal s:Uppori;edestaternent:S· _-· to wit: 1) Any such pur-
:.. .~ 
ported statements by GMAC are deemed waived and will not be 
considered, but deerned unopt',osed, Bolen v. Ba'Ji:,er, 69 Idaho 93, 
203 P.2d 375 (1949); and 2) GMAC's sole claim for claim and 
d~lj ry based upon false testimony or falsely contrived verifjcri-
...ti9'l!, beside being perjurio~s, is frivolous, unreasonable and 
without foundation; Mikesell;~ v. Newsworld Dev. Corp, 122 Idaho 
8 6 8, 8 4 0 P . 2 d 1O90 (Ct . App . 1 9 9 2 ) SANCTIONS l•! ERE/ ARE IN ORDER.:.. 
( Appellant refers to and incorporates herein his arguments, 
statements and cited legll case and other law authorities from 
his APPELLANT'S OPENING BiIEF, PG 1-3, 5-7, and 10-15, in 
further support of his above requsted conclusions.) 
2. THE,PARKHES DEClSIIO'N 149 Idaho 840, s'UPP0RTS 
ALL~ APP_E.i-'i:.-ANT' S APPEAL POINT~, ARGUMENTS AND 
CALLS FOR THE GRANTING OF THIS APPEAL ON ALL P0INT5 
ISSUE RAISED. 
GMAC ' s i n r a i s i n g t h e q u e st i on II Di d GMAC Mi s 1 ea d or p,b u s e 
the Process and Fail to State a t;-~l:ise of ,A.ction ·11·, Usespdt's 
Brief, P. 9) d{_en ·falsfl:y. 9-d:YiJ,nce~Cpa9e 9, its middle paragraph. 
t h e r e of ) t h at " A 1 1 of t h E;' s e f a. c t s a r e u n d i. s p u t e d by M r . B a c hll , 
when i n point of fact and per Ru l e 5 6 Ca ) t h.r o ugh. (_ f¾ , a 11 and 
each of tb.e advanced facts by GMAC werencyt·: only disput.~d but also, 
legally by Appellant's cited authorities, unsustainable. 
? 
Parkwest Homes, LLC v. Barson, 149 Idaho, 238 P.3d 203 
did not involve any determinations of any Degree of Summary 
administration. It factually deal with an unlicensed building 
contractor verified claim under I.C. section 54-5208 This Court 
held "the contractor must alleged and prove that he was a duly 
registered (licensed) contractQI'.' 1 or exempt from registration 'at 
all times during the performance of such or contract. 1 11 (149 
Idaho 60'.L 608-609) 
Parkwest specifically h~,d· that the required verification 
required the express statement that having read "the mechani.c I s 
lien and know the contents thereof, the same is true of my own 
knowledqe. The district court held' that the construction con-
tract was yq:,J.o· · since Parkwest was not registered at the time 
it signed the contract. (149 Idaho@ 608) 
This Idaho Supreme Court , ci.ting Barry v. Pacific We.st 
Const'n, Inc. 140 Idaho 827, 832, further held it as well as 
the district court had the same duty to raise the issue of 
ril·legality of the construction contract in question. (149 Idaho 
@ 608) PARKWEST's 
Moreover, 
i s '1 a d es tr e t o 
application establishes lack of jufiscidtion & fail-
th f th . d . f . t . to state a e purpose o e requ, re ver, , ca 1 on claim. 
frustrate th.e fiJtng of fri.Yolous claims .. " C@ 606).3 
and to avoid the mandatory pleadi~requirements of IRCP Rule 9(a), 9(c) and 9(d). 
3 -
GMAC' s comp l a int ' s fa i l u re to al l e g e the re q u i red pref i l in g 
conditions of it, via either Semperian, Inc. or it's own corp-
orate, authorized to do business in Idaho branches, of perfecting 
per Idaho statutes, within the first four (4) months the vehicle 
was licensed/registered in Idaho, fa4led to allege the required 
,. found at i o n aJ co n d i t i on s of a c l a t m and de l i v e r y act i o n , Par kw e ~s. t 
v. Bafnson , 149 Idaho@ 608. GMAC has failed to state an action 
for cl aim and delivery. It has stated no other cl aims nor any 
other cause of actio,n. GMAC's summary judgment shou~d have been 
dismissed with prejudice and Appellant should have been granted 
~ summary judgment against GMAC. 
See Fitzqefald v. Am-;erica:n Gen. Fin. Inc. (Bkrptcy D. Idaho 
1998) {Jn.r-e Ps·alto) 225 Bankr. 753. (Alse, pages 10-22, A.O.B., 
incorporated herein and reassertd in full as to all arguments and 
authorities cited/raised.) 
Moreover, for GMAC to have wit~in four l4) months of said 
ye hie le being b. rough. t i_ n Id ah o and to be reg. iS; t ere d here, i t 
was additionally required, beyond the statutes and legal authori-
ties cited tn AppellantLs 0peni.n~ Brie~ to comply with I.C. 49-
5 Q 2 a n d 4 9 --5 04 C 2 ) ( 3 ) C 4 ) ~ w h i_ c h s t a t u t e s w e r e n e v e r a l l e g e d i n t h e 
unverified complaint nor raised as part of GMAC's motion initially 
nor by any timely, relevantly, admiisble s~owing with certified 
documents per v er i. f i e d prop. Q,flY a ff i d a y tt s, Se e ~ls o ' I -;' C . 4 9 - 5 0 6 ) 
/1 
Various pertient questions and actions were not 
pursued nor taken, to wit: 
1. How was an undocumented emp1oy~e of s,emrerian Inc., 
no 1on!'.ferauthorized to do busi.ness i.n Idaho but claiming 
to work for Sew~etiari in Arizona have personal knowledge 
of what exact contract of purchase was entered into by 
Cindy L. Bach on Jan. 6, 2007 in Bozeman, Montana when no 
representative nor au1y authorized agent was empowered to 
act for, sign for and agree for both Semperian, Inc. and 
GMAC? 
2. Jhat were the speific foundational facts of how, 
what and when did Kathleen FitzGerald acquire as her knowledge 
of the facts, when she was unwilling to verify, under oath 
of the truth of smid facts of her own personal knowledge but 
instead on claimed 11 and believed the facts therein." ? 
3. How did she purportedly sign her one page verification 
two (2) days before the complaint was prepared and signed 
April 22, 2009? (One can't incorporate by reference a document ~non exist~nt!) 
(Appellant's Opening Brief's pagffi l through 14 are incorp-
orated herein in further support.) 
4. If Kathleen FitzGerald was so knowleable of an Idaho Claim and 
delivery action per I.e. J . why did she fail to comply with 
Idah.0 1 s statute re within 4 months of fhe vehicle 1 sregisteration 
in Idaho, a ,new.~security lien was to be per,ected butneither alleged, nor 
• ''> , ' 
addressed in the complaint and was not proven by any of its aver-
ments?? 
5 
GMAC and its counsel, have, an employee of said non 
franchised and withdrawn corporation, Semperian, Inc. made with-
out capacfty or standing misrepresentati~ns and misstatments, to 
de pr i v e App e 11 an t of t he t it 1 e , u s e and f u 1 1 v a 1 u e of s a i d e:q u i -
nox, Itis patently clear that such deception and subtrafuge 
is ~r GMAC's consent, permission and its authority extended to 
its attorney of record herein. Buch deception and abuse of process 
is there6ore admitted by GMAC and its attorney in pursuing a com-
plaint on a single count, claim and delivery per I.C. 8-301 
and as stated supra herein and in Appellant's Opening Brief, 
it is admitting relevant and materail evidence agaisnt GMAC on 
Appellant's counterclaim issues. C~lTaha~ V. Wolfe 88 Idaho; 440, 
400 P.2d 1938 (1965). 
' ' ' 
Rather than address Appellant's No. 3, issue·, Whether the 
district court judgment could personally and without notice, apply 
his undisclosed, untestified and without authority or qualifica-
tions of his expert testimony, applying such undisclosed and 
s u b ,J e c t i_ v e 1 y i MO \1 · v e d f a c t s· t o g r a n t s u mm a r y j u d q rn e n t , i n d i s -
1!1tssi,n~ all issues of Appellant's counterclaims. (AOB, Pg 10 -34) 
Re s po n d e n t c o n v o 1-u t es · . q n d a yo t d s t be i, s s u e r a i s e d b Y 
the district court's void and without jurisdiction acti~n~, 
6 
3. IT WASN'T PERSci~A( HEARSAY TESTIMONY WHICH THE 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE ON HIS OWN. SUA SPONTE, APPLIED 
AND USED TO GRANT SUMMARY JUDGM[NlL VIA - THE RUSE OF 
JUDICrAL NOTICE: IT WAS UNAUTHORIZED AND UNPROVEN EXPERT TEST!-
.. MONY APPLIED~TOGRANT FULL SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO RESPONDENT 
- - ---------------------------
Respondent's Brief, pages 7-8, asks the question: "Did the 
District Courtinsert( ) personil comments into its decisions 
that were hearsay .... Mr. Bach asserts this issue on the basis 
of the Court's comments pert~inipg to the weather conditions in 
Teon County, Idaho as contained in its Memorandum Decision· R . 
pgs 0090-0098 .. . The Memorandum Decision was withdrawn 
and replaced by the Amended Memorandum Decision dated September 
3, 2010. R.p. 0141 The Court address these issues in its Amended 
Me!J1orandum Decision. R. 0149-0151." 
Respondent's statements are grossly incorrect, incomplete 
and further misleading compoiundingly further deceptive. Under 
Part 2, of the initial referened MEMORANDUM DECISION, R. 0096 
this is what the district court ruled and found as "evidence" 
via "taking judical notice": 
"2. Mr. Bach's counterclaim is dismissed in its entirety. 
Mr. Bach's counterclaim alleges various torts, breaches 
of contract, fraud, and violations of consumer protection laws 
by GMAC. In particular, he alleges that GMAC slandered title 
to_t~e Equinox, th~t GMAC was fraudulent in its actions per-
ta1n1ng to the making of the contract and enforcing the contract, 
andthat the vehicle is defective becuase the car's braking system 
and four-whell drive did not operate safely in Teton County in 
the winter .. 
First, the Court takes judical notice that it is danger-
ous to drive in many plac~s in _Idaho during the winter, including 
Teton Coanty .. Th.is ·;s tri1e whether one is driving in an Eq,uj-n@x 
d~· ~--$~6W~it. Mr. Bach's mere assertion that there are braking 
and four-wheil-drive problems with his vehicle in Teton County 
7 
is insufficient to allow GMAC to form an answer or put 
notice as to complaint. Such claims do not meet even the 
liberalplead.ing requirements of Rule 8(a)(l) and 9(f) of 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
These bare allegtatons, unsubstantiated py any admissi~le 
expert testimony are also an inadequate response to GMAC's 
judgment motions. Rather than provide the Court with some 
expert testimony or other evidence of hi.s claims, Mr. Bach 
has rest on the conclusory allegations in his counterclaim. 
These allegations are insufficent to surviv summary judgment." 
(R. 0096) 
FIRST , The statements by the district court of what Appel-
lant pled in his counterclaims is grossly inaccurate and conttived. 
Thi s Honor ab l e Court is ref erred to AO B , pages 5 through 7, w hi ch 
are incorporated herein. The district court aforesaid three (3) 
paragraphs are not just inapplicable, confusing and misstating 
of Affiant 1 s Counterclaim, which was never the aubject matter, nor 
addressed by GMAC's summary judgment motion. 
SE£OND, in the second quoted paragraph of the distr.ict court's 
referring what is true ( 11 This is true whether one is driving in 
an Equinox or a Snowcat, 11 such jddicial notice is unsupported and 
irrelevantly inadmissi ble, add immaterial. Besides what section 
of I.R.E., 201 does such no·: discript and unproven judical notice 
statment is it based. If the district court deems such judicial 
notice information mandatory under r~R.E., Rule 201 (d) it required: 
"When a party makes an oral or written request that a court 
take judicial notice of recor~s, exhibits or transcripts from 
the court file in the same or a separate case, the party shall 
identify the specific documents or items for which the judicialn 
noticeis requested or shall prooffer to the court and serve on 
parties copies of such documents or itesm. A court shall take 
judicial notice of requested by a party and supplied with the 
necessary inofrmation. 11• 
Neither Respondent nor the Court complied with such mandates. 
8 
Nor did the district court comply with the requirements of 
I.R.E, Rule 20l(e) give the right to Appellant at any time "to 
an opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judical 
not i c e and the tenor of the matter not i c e d . '' 
Under this second quot~ paragraph from the district ~ourt's 
reasoning basis of including 11 a SNOWCAT", where, what and why did such 
irre levan-.t and nonlicensed. vehicle become a fixation and focus 
by the district court. There is no statement/averment in the 
counterclaim of Appellant of any aspect of a defense, affirmative 
defense nor issuein any of his counterclaims which raises anywhere 
theoperational characteristics, good bad or indifferent of a SNOW-
CAT! 
T IRO as Respondent's summary judgment motion was solely 
based and limited to only issue of his complaint per I.C. 8 301, 
~~for claim and delivery, the subjects within said third and conclu-
c.,.~:~··: l'i.·.:-...,, 
ing paragraph, (R. 0096) by the district courtare way out of line, 
nonsequitor and reveals that the district court per the second 
above paragraph whi.ch starts with the words, "First the Court takes 
.jUdicial notice that it is dang~rou~.to drive in many places in 
Idaho during the winter, including Teton Coanty" is the district 
court's void and precluded testimony and what every unstated and 
unpresented expert claims without foundationsl showing, etc. 
A c o u r t j u d g e · p re s i d i n g ma _y n Q t t e s t i f y . N Q o b j e c t i. o n n e e d b e ma d e 
to preserve th.i~s or any evi.dence he th_i_nki_s b .. e ts competent as 
a witness. r.R.E. Rule 605, A judge canoot ~ewar himself in and 
then proceed to give expert opinions in violation of Rule 703; 
moreover, ,an oath or affirmatton "shall be requi_red to declare 
he will testify truthfully. I.R.E, Rule 603. Lastly, when was 
given such notices and an opportunity to impeach said teYtimony? 
FOURTH,·· Appell ant "s countercl ai:ms weremandatory under IRCP, 
13(a), a pleading under Rule 7(al and per Rule B(f) was req-
ired "shall be so construed as to do substantial justice." 
REspondent never flled and there was not before the distric 
court, at any time, nor when he was presented with respondent's 
summary judgment motton, any motion for a more definite state-
ment as to Appellant 1s mandatory counterclaim .per IRCP, Rule 
l2(e). Nor did Respondent at any time raise either formally 
or otherwise a Rule l2(b)(6) motion nor argue or present any 
memorandum tosupport a Rule l2(b)(6) motion with a set noticed 
date for hearing. No hearing ever focused on any of such TIMELY 
AND PROPERLY SERVED FURTHER MOTION FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATE-
MENT WHICH IF MADE, HEARD AND GRANTED WOULD HAVE GRANTED LEAVE 
!r 
TO APPELLANT TO FILE AMENDED COUNTERCLAIMS. 
At Respondent rs Brief, rage 8, it is snidely stated: 
II In addition, the court not-ed that 'there is no 
reason why such a statement would indicate any bias against 
Bae· by the Court. Nevertheless, in order to clear the record 
unnecessary issues, the Court hs removed the statement from 
th i. s amended order . 1· R • p . 0 l 5 O . 11 
But even this sta~e~ent and q~ote of t~e district court 
is accurate and deceptively deficient to correct any void effects 
of what the district court did without authority, jurisdiction 
Bnd in violatt:on of any testi.mony being pre 'luded by the I.R.E., 
Ru l e s 1 q u. o t e d u n d e r PAR T TH l R D ~ S U p RA , p a g e g , h e r e Of . In 
the district court's AMENDED MEMORANDUM DECISION, filed Sept 3, 
l 0 
2010 (R 0141~1551 , it convolutedly and obfuscatfngly 
attempted to justify and somewhat ameliorate h_is statements 
in his said ffrst Memorandum Deci~fon (supra, pages 6-8). 
Starting at page 9, of his AMENDED MEMORANDUM DECISION, 
(R. 149) under paragraph 'n(7) Bach's claims that he has been denied 
a fair and impartial judge.~ (See and reference for incorpora-
tion the four (4) motions Appellant filedMay 17, 2010, R 0099-
0109; especially starting with Rl02-0l09). 
~l7) Bachi~ claims that he has been denied a fair and 
i m p a r t i_ l a j u d g e . 
B a c h ar g u e s t hat h i s d u e p r o c e s s r i. g h t s h. av e b e e n v i o l a t e d 
because he ha~been denied a fair and impartial judge. Al-
though itis difficulat to discern the reasons for this, during 
oral argument Bach focused on two actions by the trial judge: 
(l) the Court 'taking judicial notice that it is is dangerous 
to drive in many places in Idaho during the winter, including 
Teton County, : 21 and (2) the Court assisting GMAC by opining 
during the July 7, 2009 hearing that by taking the vehicle thr-
ougha decree of summary administration, Bach assumed all lia-
b i l it y c o n n e c t e d t o t h e r,,~'ei R i c l e . 
The Idaho Rules of Evidence recognize that a trial court can 
take judicial notice of the following adjudicated facts; 
A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dis-
pute in that it is (l) generally known within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and 
determination by reason of sources whose accuracy cannot be 
reasonably questioned. 
I.R.E. 20l(b) (Emphasis added). 
The Court's recognition that Teton County, Idaho is an area 
with severe winter weather is neither surpirsing nor a 1.ach. 
Located only miles from the Grand Teton Mountains and ttfe Grand 
Targhee Ski resort, such information is generally known through-
out the Seventh Judicial District. The admission of2fuch gen-9eneral knowledge hardly breaks any new legal ground. More 
- 1 1 
importantly, there is no reason why such a statement would 
indicate any bias against Bach by the Court. Nevertheless, 
in order to clear the record of unnecessary issues, the Court 
has removed that statement from this amended order. 
Likewise, the Court's reference to the legal impact of 
Bach's summary administration is niether inapbropirate nor 
indicative of bias. The Court is not requied to base its 
legal analysis of an issue solely on the issues raised by 
the attorneys. In the recent case of Parkw~st Homes LLC v. 
Barnson, ---P.3d --, (2010 WL 2541022, June 25, 2010), the 
appe 11 ant argued that the trial courtin sua sponte raising· the 
issue of illegality. The Idaho Supreme Court hela: 
The distict court did not err in sua sponte raising 
that issue. In Barry we held that "this Court has a 
duty to r a i s e the 1 s s-u e of i 11 e gal i ty . I' _id . , and the 
d t s tr i c t c Q u rt h. ad t h. e $ ~me d u t y . 
2010 WL 2541022*5, (citing Barry v. Pacific West Construction 
Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 832.: 103 P.3d 440, 445 (2004). 
While the Court concedes it may not have been a duty to 
raise the issue, such as in the case of legality or mootness, 
it was certainly not error for it to do so. A trial court 
judge is not required to disregard his knowledge of the in-
APPLICABLE LAW IN DECIDING AN ISSUE .. " (R. 0149-0150) 
The di st r i ct court , then on page l l ( R . al 5 4 l u n d e-r " I I . 
Bach's Counterclaims are Dismissed.", repeated the first 3 
paragraphs as set forth UNDER part "2. (pages 7-8 supra herein) 
BUT deleting the very FIRST sentence of the second paragraph, 
and st art i n g said par a graph " . . Bach I s mere assert i on that~: 
tb_ere ~re liraki:ng and four-wheel-drive problems with his vehicle 
~n Teton County is insufficient to allow GMAC to form an ans-
wer or put them on notice as to complaint ... "(R. 0151) 
(The ,,gistrict court judge then went on/continued to deny 
all of Appellant's motionsincluding his motion to amend his counter-
claims pursuant to IRCP 15(a) and {b). (r. 0151-0;54) Bur the 
district court added somewhat accusatorially: 11 The timing of Bach's 
request for leaue to amend i~ al~d troubling. It was only after 
the Courtgranted GMAC's motion for summary judgment that he brought 
this motion. Itis not fair to GMAC to win on summary judgment, 
only,to have the pleadings completely reqritten so that Bach has new 
survyvingclaims. . 11 (R. 0154) 
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Appellant contends and argues that it is not fair for the 
district court on its own, without notice to appellant, to 
expand, include and sua sponte expand and add to Respondent's 
motion for summary judgment which was noticed and limited only 
Respondent's to such motion to the unverified complaint for 
summary judgment on the claim and delivery single action per I.C. 
8-301 and did not notice nor raise summary judgment on Appel 
lant 1 s numerous cunterclaism. The district court's sua sponte 
expansion of such unmade, timely and procedurally of its motion 
for summary judgment on Appellabt 1 s counterclaism and its above 
quoted reasons were above and beyond the issues of Rule 56. 
. " .. 
Fuller v. Dave,c,a:,iT>iister (Idaho 2011} 252 P.3d 1266, 1269 ( 11 The 
party against whom the (summary judgment will be entered must be 
given adequate notice and an opportunity to demonstrate why sum 
mpry judgment should not he entered~ It is also true that a distric1 
may notdecide an issue ndt rafsed in the moving party's motion for 
s Um ni a r y Ju d g rri e nt . '1 ( Em p h a s i s a a d e d } ; Po s e y · v . F o r d Mot o r c r e d i t 
Co., 141 Idaho 477, 11 P3d 162 (Ct. App. 2005) 
Moreover, the district court judge exhibited morethan a cont--
inuiffg patent · bias and prejudice against Appellant's arguements 
and deliberately sought to restate such arguments inaccurately 
in his concern for what the record, oral and written may otherwise 
reveal and contain. The district court judge had further exhibiWd 
patent and obvious prejudice and ~t~se against Appellant that 
he was deprived of his rights, procedurally and substantively 
to due process and equal protettions under the U.S. Constiution 1 s 
Fourteenth Amendment. Litkey \i. U.S. 1994 (1994) 510 U.S. 551; 
. /41 
Dwlsey v.I.A.C. (2005)t.Jdaho 125, ct App. 
Respori'din't'$'btiefcontinues to compound and confirm that i it in-
deed h.as abuse the process of the Court and fatled to state a cause of action 
claim and deli.very; th.at ts used~ advanced and mi_srepresented a clearjy VOID 
and unveri:fied cl aim to bbtai.n il legihly via a further i_ssued VOID WRIT OF 
POSSESSION Of ·[qutnox, and pfoceed tn a wholly unreasonably 
commercial manher,never selling it at any noticed or properly 
held public auction--neither giving appellant credit nor proof of 
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fu]l and complete monetary value was paid for it. Respondent 
Brief admits that the district court and it more than misapplied 
and abused the process of the void and criminal actions per 
aits lack of jurisdiction claim and delivery action to deprive 
Appell ant's constitutional rights to due process and equal pro-
t e c t i o n , i g n o r i n g t h e - d e c i s i o n o f t h i s ' I da'. h o · S u p r em e C o u r t of 
Parkwest Homes, LLC v. Barnson, 149 Idaho 603,608. Appellant 
refers to and incorporates specifically all statements and 
arguments, pages 2-7, supra. 
For allth.e foregoing reasons, statements and arguments 
set forth, supra, Respondent GMAC was not entitled nor with 
standing or capacity to obtain any judgment, nor damages, nor 
attorney's fees before the district court nor per this appeal - . 
CONCLUSION: Appellant's appeal should be granted herein, with 
remand to the,district court to dismiss with prejudice Respondent's 
void and without jurisdiction claim and delivery sole, a'ction 
count and reinstating and proceeding with the counterclaims to 
a jury trial before a newly assigned impartial and unbiased judge. 
DAT50: September 23, 2011 
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